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Evaluating the board of directors of financial 
intermediaries: competencies, effectiveness and 
performance 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a model for analysing the effectiveness of boards of directors of financial 
intermediaries. The European Union recommends that companies in the Member States 
annually evaluate the performance of their boards. The degree of effectiveness of a board 
should be appreciated taking into account the business structure, ownership and institutional 
model of the firm, on the one hand, and the characteristics of its board, in terms of its 
composition, structure and skills, on the other hand.  
This paper also outlines the specificity of the role played by boards of directors in financial 
intermediaries, also in the light of the industry standards and regulations, and provides an 
overview of the board assessment methodologies proposed in literature, or developed by 
listed companies on the Anglo-saxon markets, with a view to considering their applicability to 
the financial sector. Lastly, and based on the foregoing, the paper proposes a model for 
diagnosing the conditions that need to be put into place to ensure the suitability of boards of 
directors and to evaluate the performance of both the board as a whole and the individual 
directors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years the improvement of corporate governance systems has become a priority in 
industrialized countries (OECD, 2004)
1
.  
This development has been boosted by the widespread conviction that efficient corporate 
governance practices may enhance the reliability, transparency and integrity of businesses, 
translating into added value for the firm, lower capital costs and improved market 
competitiveness. 
Corporate governance is taking on an increasingly central role in all sectors of the economy. It 
is based on the definition of clear rules, with respect to relations between companies and 
investors, and the identification of the specific responsibilities of the supervisory authorities, 
which play a key role in promoting efficient and transparent capital markets. 
Within corporate governance, structure and functioning of boards of directors (BoDs) are 
important topics, which have been vested, over the years, with increasingly broad and 
complex tasks, ranging from setting strategic development guidelines to guiding and 
supervising the performance of management. An unreliable board determines investor distrust 
and, consequently, the increased cost of capital. 
BoD, therefore, is an institution that can help to limit management-related agency problems, 
which primarily concern conflicts of interest between the ownership and the management of a 
business, and represents a key governance mechanism for making sure that the objectives of 
the shareholders and those of the management are kept in line. 
In the financial sector, the Basel Committee (2005) has introduced a series of indications, 
with respect to the activities of boards, ranging from responsibility for compliance with 
corporate governance codes, to guaranteeing the implementation of state-of-the-art internal 
control systems and the transparency of information flows to the outside world.  
These guidelines are fostering developments in the BoDs of financial intermediaries which, 
besides compliance with the requirements prescribed by the applicable laws and regulations, 
also concern their structure and operation, in a framework of a greater independence, with 
respect to both the needs of the individual shareholders and the objectives of management. 
More and more importance is being given in literature, as well, to the study of the 
characteristics of BoDs and to the consequences of such characteristics, in terms of overall 
performance. In addition, board rating models are spreading, together with more wide-ranging 
attempts to measure the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and, therefore, the 
performance of the boards themselves. 
The purpose of this paper is that of representing the complexity of board evaluation processes 
in banking and financial industry, in the light of the relevant characteristics in terms of the 
composition, structure and skills.   
This paper is structured as follows: 
Part one investigates the relationship between BoD quality and corporate performance, in the 
light of the examples given in literature. Subsequently the key problems relating to the BoD 
assessment process are discussed, and the relevant specific traits of the boards of financial and 
banking firms, for evaluation purposes, are examined. Lastly, the paper proposes a model for 
analysing the conditions for ensuring the effectiveness of BoDs in financial intermediaries. 
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 OECD defines corporate governance as “a set of relationships between a firm’s management, its board, its 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the firm are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to 
pursue objectives that are in the interests of the firm and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring, 
thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently”.  
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2. Highlighting the link between corporate governance, BoD quality, 
and corporate performance 
2.1 The characteristics of boards of directors and corporate performance 
The basic assumption of this paper is the conviction that there is a positive relationship 
between the quality, in the sense of accountability, of a firm’s corporate governance model 
and the market value of the firm. Decisive elements of this relationship are market efficiency 
and disclosure of informations on corporate events, such as to allow investors to appreciate 
whether or not good corporate governance practices have been put into place and are capable 
of protecting the interests of all the stakeholders concerned. 
However, to date, the link between corporate governance and corporate performance has yet 
to be confirmed. This is partially due to the fact that corporate governance rules have only 
recently been introduced by listed firms. The process, moreover, is still under way and, 
despite the fact that stock exchanges generally require companies to inform the market 
whether or not they have adopted corporate governance codes and standards, the culture of 
many investors, in this respect, has not yet been fully shaped. This as yet limited appreciation 
of corporate governance is also due to investors’ preference for short-term results, especially 
among certain institutional investors (for example, investment fund management firms), 
wherein the focus is on making high profits fast, rather than on setting up organizational and 
management mechanisms capable of guaranteeing the medium-term stability of the firm. 
To fully appreciate the quality of a corporate governance model one must necessarily judge 
the quality of the BoD and, in particular, assess the impact of the board’s structure and 
performance on corporate performance. 
Moreover, any appraisal of the BoD must focus on the role of this body, its most significant 
functions, and the manner of fulfilment thereof, with a view to determining the board 
activities most capable of enhancing the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
According to the classical outlook (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Williamson, 1985; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989), the BoD ensures that the firm aims at attaining the 
maximum satisfaction of its shareholders, or stakeholders in general. The board may be 
viewed as the tool through which the ownership takes part in the management of the firm. 
The “agency theory” supports the BoD’s function as the body responsible for monitoring the 
behaviour of the agents – i.e. the managers – with respect to the policies set by the principal – 
i.e. the shareholders – while searching for solutions capable of integrating the supposed 
conflicts of interest between the two partners. The BoD is called upon to produce solutions 
maximizing the wealth of the suppliers of risk capital and minimizing agency costs, i.e. the 
transaction costs related to the policy-making and agent monitoring activities. 
Moreover, based on its composition, and on the ownership characteristics of the firm, the 
BoD may also take on the alternative function of constituting a core of dominant managers, a 
group of “supervisors” authorized by the stakeholders, a “service” body for the management, 
setting down policies and guidelines, or the controlling shareholders in whose interest the firm 
operates. 
Assigning a service-providing function to the BoD shifts the focus onto organization, 
underlining the board’s nature as a corporate body. The resource-based view acknowledges its 
relevance as a strategic resource for the firm, and its ensuing impact on corporate performance 
(Mace, 1986; Provan, 1980). The services provided range from consulting to information, 
from managing external affairs to networking, within the firm’s significant environment. 
Therefore, the board’s capacity to formulate and implement successful strategies, by 
developing adequate internal mechanisms, to monitor and supervise the work of the senior 
management, and to provide information to all the stakeholders, is the cornerstone of its 
overall performance, and is directly linked to corporate performance too. 
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Jensen (1993) also recognizes the existence of an implicit link between the characteristics and 
quality of the BoD and overall corporate performance
2
. In particular, the quality of the former 
positively affects the latter because its enables: 
- correct governance of corporate strategies; 
- improved management skills, with regard to tackling crises or addressing competitive 
pressure and turnaround processes; 
- efficient supervision of the internal control system; 
- improved communication to the market of the board’s attention to the issue of value 
for shareholders. 
 
Moreover, the board’s effectiveness in attaining its objectives must be supported by suitable 
structural, organizational and individual characteristics. The following paragraphs, in fact, are 
dedicated to investigating the links between these characteristics and the BoD’s performance.  
 
 
2.2 The institutional and structural characteristics of the BoD 
With respect to the institutional characteristics of the BoD, reference is made to certain 
factors, such as its dimensions, composition (in terms of the level of shareholder 
representation), relations between executive and non-executive directors, number of 
independent directors, presence of so-called “multi-role shareholders”, and related degree of 
role asymmetry, relations between the chief executive and other directors, multiple 
directorships (i.e. directors holding positions on the boards of more than one firm, at the same 
time), and, last but not least, the number of female directors. Concerning the first item, Jensen 
(1993), and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), maintain that the larger the BoD the lower the 
corporate performance. Such a claim is essentially based on the consideration that, when a 
board has too many members, they inevitably take on a purely symbolic role and their 
activities become disjointed from the management processes. This theory is also held by 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Yermack (1996). The former has identified a negative relationship 
between a board’s size and Tobin’s Q ratio
3
, in a representative sample of Finnish companies. 
While the latter has identified the same relationship in a representative sample of US 
companies. 
Although it is true that, as a rule, group decisions are better than individual decisions (Hill, 
1982), especially in highly complex and uncertain situations, it must also be taken into 
account that the larger BoDs have to face such problems as the impairment of the decision-
making process, the hazy nature of the individual members’ responsibilities, and a certain 
detached attitude vis-à-vis the facts handled by the management. 
According to this viewpoint, and based on group dynamics theories, an excessively large 
board could condition decision-making and there might be communication and organization 
problems, also in consequence of the formation of internal factions or coalitions. 
Secondly, the de-responsabilizing effect of large boards might create consensus-related 
problems, with respect to important decisions, thus posing considerable problems in respect of 
management control activities (Forbes and Milliken 1999; Golden and Zajac 2001). 
However, Zahra and Pearce (1989) claim that large BoDs may more effectively control the 
executive bodies, because of the greater difficulty for the latter to influence the directors. 
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In particular, he maintains that “the board, at the apex of the internal control system, has the final 
responsibility for the functioning of the firm”. 
3
 This measure identifies the link existing between the market value of the capital (plus the net liabilities) and the 
cost of replacement of the fixed assets. 
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With regard to board composition, a number of studies examine both the role and the 
proportion of independent directors, compared to the total directors. Generally speaking, non-
executive directors, i.e. directors who have no particular connections with the firm, are chosen 
not just for their professional standing, but also for their independence of judgement, and the 
request for membership of the BoD increasingly responds to the needs and requests 
formulated by the institutional investors. 
According to the agency theory approach, the BoD is a governance mechanism designed to 
soften the potential conflict of interest between ownership and management (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). Theoretically at least, its effectiveness would be 
further enhanced if the proportion of non-executive independent directors were dominant. 
This, in fact, would ensure the heighest degree of independence, in respect of relations 
between controller and controllee, and would minimize any conflicts of interest. 
Moreover, the problem for the management, in Holmstrom’s view (1999), is not just that of 
undertaking the right actions when tackling the various situations in the life of a business 
concern, but also achieving a certain degree of commitment in the attainment of its objectives. 
The directors’ independence could also increase the effectiveness of the incentive-
enhancement mechanisms put into place by the senior management. 
However, in practice, the presence of independent directors produces a rather contradictory 
effect. Various studies, in fact, seem to prove that there are no direct links with corporate 
performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Coles et al., 2003). 
Bhagat and Black (2000) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), who also employ Tobin’s Q 
ratio to measure performance, conclude that the board composition has no effect whatsoever 
on performance, and may even be deleterious. 
On the contrary, other studies suggest that appointing independent directors to the board has a 
positive effect on performance (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; 
Pearce and Zahra 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). 
Lastly, Wagner et al. (1998) maintain that the best performance is linked to a balanced 
membership of both executive and non-executive independent directors, a conclusion which 
supports the appointment to the board of equal numbers of directors from the two groups, and 
represents a suitable agreement between the various results analysed hitherto. 
One of the reasons, in fact, explaining the differences in the conclusions reached by the 
various studies stems from the consideration that, as a rule, a larger number of independent 
directors is appointed during particularly critical situations for companies, as a means of 
signalling to the market a greater transparency and effort, with respect to the implementation 
of internal control systems.  
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) maintain that many boards often work badly and rarely adopt a 
critical stance with respect to the management’s decisions. This is due primarily to the 
influence exercised by the senior management in the selection of non-executive directors. 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) support this point of view and observe a negative link 
between the senior management’s influence in the director recruitment process and the BoD’s 
performance monitoring capacity. 
Given the significance of this issue, the assessment of the directors’ independence is expressly 
envisaged by the Italian corporate governance code for listed companies (the so-called “Preda 
Code”), consistently with the recommendation by the European Commission
4
. 
Having regard to the so-called “multiple-role shareholders”
5
, Schwizer (1998) maintains that 
the presence of role asymmetries by shareholders may affect the formulation of strategic 
                                                 
4
 Recital 7 of the Commission Recommendation affirms that “the presence of independent representatives on the 
board (...) is widely considered as a means of protecting the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders”, 
while recital 9 adds that the supervisory role of non-executive directors is crucial in areas where the potential for 
conflict of interest of management is particularly high, such as: nomination of directors, remuneration of 
directors, and audit. 
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policies, besides the assessment of corporate performance, due precisely to the different 
objective functions. 
 
In the face of such a situation, therefore, it is important to seek to establish a balance in the 
distribution of the powers of shareholders in the BoD, in order to ensure the representation of 
all interests, without jeopardising the unitary nature of the goals pursued. 
Concerning the structure and separation of the roles of chief executive and BoD, the studies 
carried out to date show contradictory results in this case also. 
The dualism between chief executive and board, which is expressed through the degree of 
separation between the roles of chief executive and chairman of the BoD, is related to 
corporate performance. Donaldson and Davis (1991) suggest how the co-existence of the two 
roles in one and the same person (dualism) allows the achievement of improved corporate 
performance, compared to the cases in which the roles are separate. Consistently with these 
results are those obtained by Rechner and Dalton (1991), who demonstrate how the 
performance achieved by companies that separate the two roles are, on average, lower than 
that achieved by those that unite them.  
However, Dalton et al. (1998), demonstrate how the structure and degree of separation 
between the roles of chief executive and chairman of the BoD is wholly uninfluential, in 
terms of the financial performance of a firm, thus highlighting yet again the scarce agreement 
among experts, with respect to the confirmation of the relationship between this variable and 
corporate performance
6
.  
Having regard to multiple directorships, Brown and Maloney (1999) highlight how, in the 
case of corporate acquisitions, the fact that the directors hold office on more than one BoD is 
positively related to the success of the operations. This operation may be explained 
considering the importance of personal relations between the individual directors in such 
operations. 
In agreement with this theory are also Miwa and Ramseyer (2000), who suggest how the 
presence of directors holding positions on a number of boards is strongly linked to higher 
performance. 
Ferris et al. (2003) also underline that multiple directorships are linked to the higher overall 
performance of a firm. The results of their analyses show how the appointment of a new 
director who already holds one or more directorships in other companies determines an 
increase in the value of the shares, in the case of listed companies. 
The concept of “diversity” in the composition of a BoD and, in particular, the aspect of 
diversity represented by female participation, is becoming a core issue in studies on corporate 
governance. Currently, according to the Female FTSE Report 2004, with respect to the FTSE 
100 index, women directors account for a meagre 17% of all directors. 
In literature, the arguments in favour of a larger female presence may be summarised as 
follows: 
- boards would be more effective, thanks to the availability of a wider pool of talents 
from which to recruit independent directors (Adams, Ferreira, 2004); 
                                                                                                                                                        
5
 The term “multiple-role shareholders” refers to those shareholders who carry out a number of functions in the 
firm in which they hold a stake, such as, contributors of credit capital (financers), suppliers of production factors 
(e.g., the distribution network), customer (either directly or, as is more often the case, in view of transactions 
with their customers) of the services provided by the firm. A typical example of this figure is represented by 
those banks that hold an interest in specialized financial intermediary firms, such as leasing firms, factoring 
firms, etc.. The concept may also be extended to the case of non-financial companies with a stake in banks or 
other financial intermediary firms. For more information on this topic, see Schwizer, 1998. 
6
 With regard to this matter, the Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 also maintains that: “The 
present or past executive responsibilities of the (supervisory) board’s chairman should not stand in the way of 
his ability to exercise objective supervision. On a unitary board, one way to ensure this is that the roles of 
chairman and chief executive are separate”. 
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- it would be easier for boards to handle relations, thanks to the availability of 
diversified personal profiles (Fields, 2003); 
- the boards would be more representative of the real composition of the various groups 
of economic operators – consumers, investors, entrepreneurs, employees, 
professionals, etc. – in which the number of women is much higher than is currently 
the case in the governance bodies of the companies that target those groups (Catalyst, 
2004); 
- boards with a higher female presence would meet more often, because women would 
introduce a different “attendance model” and approach to the board’s activities, 
compared to the male members  (Adams, Ferreira, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, however, there are contrasting opinions that maintain that increasing 
differentiation could reduce agreement in the “team” of directors (Eisenhardt et al., 1997), 
because it could negatively affect trust between members of different sexes (Kanter, 1977). 
This would be particularly dangerous in periods of competitive tension, when it is of the 
essence to speed up decision making and reach a consensus as promptly as possible (Bodega, 
1998). In this sense, uncertainty and diversity would be negatively linked. Moreover, 
increasing diversity on the board would reduce the propensity of the individual members to 
identify with the other members and, consequently, their willingness to collaborate. This 
would entail the replacement of the mechanism of trust with alternative mechanisms aimed at 
coordinating behaviours and decisions, thus increasing organizational costs (Adams, Ferreira, 
2004).  
 
To date there is a shortage of empirical evidence proving either one or the other theory. 
However, it can be maintained that the evolution of the BoD’s role – in particular, in the case 
of banks, in the light of the renewed structure of the external and internal control system – 
requires a greater diversification of the skills and behaviours of the directors. Furthermore, the 
boards at the head of companies featuring a growing weight of the female component must 
sooner or later reflect this evolution. Therefore, the increased presence of women directors on 
the board could swiftly contribute to the overall improvement of the quality of the 
organization, and of the models of operation of boards, as corporate governance bodies. 
 
 
2.3 The organizational characteristics of BoDs 
By organizational characteristics we mean the processes and proceedings of BoDs. In 
particular, the presence of committees with policy-making authority, with respect to certain 
corporate ambits, the frequency of formal and informal meetings, the remuneration of 
directors, their turnover, and the existence of advanced systems for reporting management 
information, are all elements capable of affecting the quality of the BoD and, indeed, 
corporate performance. 
The establishment of committees (i.e. bodies specifying the responsibilities of the directors) 
seems to have a positive effect on corporate performance. This may be explained by making 
reference to the growing complexity of the tasks, which requires the creation of increasingly 
complex organizational structures. 
Klein (1998) has examined the effects of committees on performance, highlighting a positive 
link between the two, and with the independent directors appointed to the former. 
Substantially, therefore, he suggests that the link between board composition and corporate 
performance may be explained by making reference to the presence of committees and to the 
positions held on them by independent directors. 
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Moreover, both the Commission Recommendation (2005) and various corporate governance 
codes adopted by listed companies (such as, for example, the Combined Code, the Final 
NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, and the Preda Code) expressly provide for the creation 
of audit, nomination, and remuneration committees, with a view to ensuring and enhancing 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the BoD itself
7
. 
Furthermore, and especially with regard to financial brokers, the Basel Committee (2005) 
provides for the creation of ad hoc committees, such as: 
- a Risk Management Committee, for supervising the risk management activities carried 
out by the bank’s senior management; this role requires regular flows of information 
by the senior management on exposure to risk and on risk management activities; 
- an Audit Committee, responsible for supervising the activity of the bank’s (internal 
and external) auditors, ratifying the appointment and dismissal of auditors, examining 
and approving the range and frequency of the audits, viewing the audit reports and 
making sure that the management promptly implements the appropriate actions aimed 
at correcting any shortcomings in the auditing operations, insufficient conformity to 
policies, laws and regulations, and other problems identified by the auditors. The 
independence of this Committee may be strengthened by membership of external 
directors with banking or financial experience; 
- a Remuneration Committee, responsible for supervising the remuneration of the senior 
management and other key executive positions, including its conformity to the culture, 
objectives, strategies and control system of the bank. One of the priority objectives is 
undoubtedly that of encouraging the management to act in the interests of the 
shareholders, therefore, remuneration and incentives are an important step in this 
direction. Core et al. (1999)  show that, in the absence of these committees, the 
remuneration of chief executives tends to be higher. According to Yermack (1996), 
who indicates how by increasing the size of boards the incentive for the senior 
management also increases, therefore the committees increase the effectiveness of the 
control and require lower incentives; 
- a ,omination Committee, which provides an important assessment of the effectiveness 
of the BoD’s actions and directs membership turnover. Another interesting aspect, in 
fact, is the one concerning the relation that exists between corporate performance and 
the appointment or turnover of directors and other senior management positions. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), document the 
existence of this link. The presence of this committee may enhance the effectiveness 
of this turnover process, making it possible to more significantly monitor the 
performance of both directors and senior management executives. 
 
A further element, concerning the organization and functioning of boards, capable of affecting 
corporate performance, is represented by proceedings at BoD meetings. 
These are instruments aimed at taking significant and effective decisions, wherefore both the 
individual contribution of the directors and attendance are key aspects. They are also a special 
opportunity in which to exchange important information for the firm (Conger et al. 1998). 
                                                 
7
 With regard to this matter, the Preda Code recommends that the BoD seek the advice of the following 
committees, in performing its taks: 
- an audit committee, responsible for analysing internal control issues and implementing any procedures 
in connection therewith; 
- a remuneration committee, composed primarily of non-executive directors, because these are deemed to 
be more suited to “formulating proposals not affected by any conflicts of interest”;  
- a nomination committee, whose utility is particularly obvious in the case of difficulties by the 
shareholders, responsible for preparing appointment proposals (as may occur in the case of listed 
companies with a widespread shareholder base). 
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Based on this consideration one may easily deem that the higher the attendance at meetings 
the greater the possibility of controlling the senior management’s work. However, it must also 
be taken into account that meetings are not a measure of the efficiency of the BoD if 
attendance thereat by the directors is low, if the information system for the BoD is inadequate 
(Carretta, 1998), and if no agreements can be reached. 
Mace (1986), and Lorsch and MacIver (1989), in fact, point out that most meetings do not 
translate into any concrete actions by the BoD. This opinion is shared by Vafeas (1999), who 
considers boards as institutions more oriented towards ex post actions, with respect to 
corporate governance problems, rather than proactive policy-making or continuous 
improvement. This is a rather widespread characteristic and, by conditioning the quality of the 
decisions taken at meetings, is a limitation to the achievement of higher corporate 
performance. 
 
 
2.4 The skills present in BoDs 
According to the “resource dependence theory” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the BoD is 
considered the link between the firm and its reference environment. In fact, it has the 
responsibility of identifying and acquiring, from the outside environment, the necessary 
resources for making the firm work, with a view to reducing its dependence from the outside 
and any external threats. 
On the contrary, the “resource based view” has it that the BoD contributes to corporate 
performance not only by procuring the necessary resources from the outside, but also through 
the professional skills and expertise present within its ranks (Provan, 1980; Mace, 1986). 
The firm is viewed as the set of its resources, and capabilities and skills, may represent both a 
constraint on corporate development, if there are none, or a competitive edge, if they are 
present (Langlois and Robertson, 1995; Madhok, 1997). 
One of the responsibilities of boards, in fact, concerns the strategic policy-making of the 
senior management. In order to perform this role directors must possess the suitable skills to 
make important decisions for the firm. 
A first distinction may concern the skills related to the comprehension of the strategic 
activities underlying the firm’s operations and of the possible competitive scenarios (Nonaka, 
1994), and those concerning the traditional ambits of corporate activities that represent an 
important factor for formulating strategies (Ancona and Caldwell, 1988). 
On the contrary, a subsequent distinction may be based on firm-specific skills (those of the 
senior management and line management) and board-specific skills (those of the directors). 
The latter include, for example, educational qualifications, professional experience, 
independence, personal integrity, and the relational and networking capacities of the directors 
(Westphal and Milton, 2000). 
A further factor of interest concerning skills is the development of specific processes that are 
institutionalized within the firm through a learning process, which is also specific and cannot 
be generalized in other contexts, and which contributes directly to the creation of a shared 
culture. 
Various studies have analysed the impact of the individual skills of the directors on corporate 
performance. 
First of all, with respect to the BoD’s advisory role, the multiplicity of experience, the 
provenance and competencies of the individual directors have been related to the 
improvement of the decision-making processes and, ultimately, of corporate performance 
(Andrews, 1983; Huse and Rindova, 2001). One of the reasons for this impact may stem from 
the fact that the professional skills and experience of the directors contributes to the improved 
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implementation of the corporate strategies through enhanced decision-making, in terms of 
both efficiency and effectiveness (Leontiades, 1982; Norburn and Miller, 1981). 
Within this meaning, and based on the cognitive theories for understanding the decision-
making mechanisms of boards of directors, Forbes and Milliken (1999) maintain that the BoD 
may be viewed as a “black box” within which the principal processes take place. The 
directors’ competencies and cultural outlook are directly related to the overall quality of the 
processes. In other words, the accumulation of skills translates into various ways of 
perceiving and implementing corporate processes. 
In a specular manner, Conner and Prahalad (1996) affirm that the differences existing in terms 
of competencies and experience (in terms of both broadness and depth), among directors, may 
either facilitate or hinder the exercise of its functions by the BoD. 
When, in fact, the environment in which a firm operates features a high degree of complexity 
and dynamism, the breadth and depth of the skills of the individual directors play a key role, 
because they allow a better understanding of the competitive environment and more effective 
and efficient decision making. As a rule, the heterogeneity of the skills of the board members 
is an important element capable of facilitating the learning processes and strategic flexibility 
(Westphal et al. 2001). 
Secondly, with regard to the BoD’s monitoring functions, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) stress 
the information asymmetry that may affect performance monitoring capacities. This 
asymmetry could also be the result of a lack of competence by those responsible for 
monitoring the senior management and can translate into monitoring shortcomings. 
In this sense, a more limited set of skills may entail higher transaction costs, with respect to 
the agents’ monitoring activities. 
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3. Assessing the effectiveness of Boards of Directors 
3.1 The principal ambits of evaluation 
Assessing the performance of BoDs is considered an increasingly important issue, for 
corporate governance quality purposes, and is provided for in a number of corporate 
governance codes for listed companies
8
, and in the recently formulated Commission 
Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies 
and on the committees of the (supervisory) board
9
.  
The aim of assessment should be to identify the factors that could hinder the correct working 
of the BoD and which, to various extents, affect the overall performance of this governance 
body. 
Despite the “system of rules” defines a consistent and clear set of principles, in respect of the 
working of the BoD, it is no easy matter to set up an objective assessment procedure for a 
collegiate body – characterised by complex goals and highly heterogeneous relational models, 
both among the members themselves and with external stakeholders. 
O’Neal and Thomas (1996) have highlighted how assessing the performance of a BoD as a 
whole may produce more ambiguous results, compared to the assessment of the individual 
directors, precisely due to the lack of a shared judgement on the parameters to be taken into 
account. 
Traditionally, the performance of BoDs is linked to the role and the capacity to carry out its 
fundamental functions (Cornforth, 2001; Lorsch, 1997).  
Based on the considerations set out in the preceding paragraphs, the indicators to be taken into 
account should concern the structural, organizational and competence-related profiles of 
boards. With regard to the first aspect, the following profiles should be considered: 
- the size; 
- the proportion of independent directors; 
- the degree of heterogeneity in the represented objectives (multiple-role shareholders); 
- the separation between the roles of Chairman of the Board and chief executive; 
- the presence of directors holding directorships in other companies too; 
- the proportion of female directors. 
 
Having regard to the organizational profiles, when analysing the performance of a board 
account should be taken also of factors such as, (i) the establishment of committees assisting 
in the performance of the most important activities, (ii) the proceedings according to which 
the most important decisions are taken by the directors (such as the number of meetings, their 
duration, attendance, reporting), and (iii) the intensity and transparency of both the external 
and price-sensitive and the to the senior management communications. 
                                                 
8
 The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance sets out that: “Every firm should be headed by an effective 
board, which is collectively responsible for the success of the firm”. The importance of a rigorous evaluation of 
the board’s performance is also underlined: “The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual 
evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors”. 
With regard to this issue, the US Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules provide that: “The board should 
conduct a selfevaluation at least annually to determine whether it and its committees are functioning effectively”. 
9 
The Commission Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors and on the committees 
of the (supervisory) board, 2005, provides that: “Every year, the (supervisory) board should carry out an 
evaluation of its performance. This should encompass an assessment of its membership, organisation and 
operation as a group; include an evaluation of the competence and effectiveness of each board member and of 
the board committees; and consider how well the board has performed against any performance objectives 
which have been set”. 
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In this paper we believe that the establishment of committees is not aimed at taking over the 
responsibilities of the board, but is a prerequisite for the more efficient and effective running 
of the board. 
Lastly, with regard to the third profile, the competencies and aspects related to the mix of 
experience and training point towards the individual performance of each director. However, 
the possibility should also be taken into account of individual initiatives influencing the 
overall performance of the board. Moreover, it is not possible to establish a general 
benchmark for assessing the level of expertise of the board, because it would be necessary to 
consider a number of factors, such as, for example, the nature of the activities to be carried 
out and their complexity. Therefore, we believe that experience in the position and continuous 
training are two key elements for assessing individual skills, because they are directly related 
to the context in which the directors work. 
 
 
3.2 The different evaluation approaches 
An important aspect, with respect to measuring the performance of boards, concerns, first of 
all, the determination of the actors responsible for making the assessment. The following 
alternative solutions are provided: 
- the individual directors, or the board as a whole, could be assessed by the chairman of 
the board; 
- the directors could self-evaluate themselves and formulate a judgement as to the 
performance of the board as a whole;  
- the individual directors could assess each other by peer evaluation; 
- an external independent “evaluator” could be called in to conduct the assessment
10
.  
 
All the proposed solutions feature strengths and weaknesses. Assessments conducted by the 
directors themselves, grounded on a more in-depth knowledge of the internal workings of the 
body, should highlight its effectively critical aspects. However, as envisaged by the various 
corporate governance codes for listed companies (first and foremost, the “Combined Code”), 
the appointment of an external evaluation body may ensure greater objectiveness of 
judgement
11
. 
In Italy, the Preda Code provides that each director is responsible for assessing the adequacy 
of the (diligent and effective) performance of one’s tasks. 
Various financial intermediaries assign the responsibility for evaluating the board’s 
performance to the nomination committee (e.g., Goldman Sachs, Merril Lynch, UBS, 
                                                 
10
 With respect to this point, the Commission Recommendation provides that evaluation should be the task of 
the nomination committee, whose responsibilities include the following: 
- “Identify and recommend, for the approval of the (supervisory) board, candidates to fill board 
vacancies as and when they arise. In doing so, the nomination committee should evaluate the balance of 
skills, knowledge and experience on the board, prepare a description of the roles and capabilities 
required for a particular appointment, and assess the time commitment expected; 
- Periodically assess the structure, size, composition and performance of the unitary or dual board, and 
make recommendations to the (supervisory) board with regard to any changes; 
- Periodically assess the skills, knowledge and experience of individual directors, and report on this to 
the (supervisory) board; 
- Properly consider issues related to succession planning”. 
 
11
 Following are some of the auditing firms providing board evaluation services: Bennett Partners, Deloitte, 
Heidrick & Struggles International, Korn / Ferry International, Mercer Inc., Pearl Meyer & Partners, Spencer 
Stuart. 
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Deutsche-Bank, HSCB, Barclays, London Stock Exchange, Abn Amro, ING Groep, Credit 
Suisse Group, Citigroup). 
 
On the contrary, with regard to the assessment methods put into place, these may be broken 
down according to whether they’re based on the type of approach (qualitative or quantitative) 
or the subject (the board as a whole or the individual directors). 
Based on the evaluation guidelines, the viable tools and models may be summarised as 
follows: 
- the observation of specific individual requirements; 
- the observation of specific institutional and organizational characteristics; 
- questionnaires (self-evaluation, peer evaluation) and one-to-one interviews; 
- self-evaluation groups. 
 
An overview of the different perspectives and principal tools for evaluating boards is shown 
in the following figure (Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1 – Perspectives and tools for evaluating BoDs 
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4. Ambits of differentiation in the performance evaluation of BoDs of 
financial intermediaries 
 
A crucial aspect in designing a methodology for the performance evaluation of boards of 
financial intermediaries concerns understanding the differences compared to other types of 
business undertakings. 
A first difference is due to the necessity, by banks (as prescribed by the Supervisory Authority 
in 1999), to adopt certain internal control systems, i.e. an organic set of rules, procedures and 
structures capable of ensuring, (i) the fulfillment of the corporate strategies and the 
achievement of the goals of efficiency and effectiveness, vis-à-vis the corporate processes 
(administrative, productive, distributive, etc.), (ii) the safeguarding of the value of the assets 
and protection of the losses, (iii) the reliability and integrity of the accounting and 
management information, and (iv) conformity of all operations to the applicable law, 
supervisory regulations and to internal policies, plans and procedures. 
In this ambit, the boards of financial intermediaries (including the executive committee and 
other governance bodies), in their capacity as the body primarily responsible for ensuring the 
functionality and efficacy of internal controls, is called on to carry out specific activities, as 
follows: 
- to approve the strategic policy lines and risk management policies. The board must be 
fully aware of the risks the bank is exposing itself to, it must know and approve the 
procedures through which the risks are identified and assessed; 
- to approve the bank’s organizational structure; here the board must make sure that the 
tasks and responsibilities have been apportioned in a clear and appropriate manner – 
especially with regard to the mechanisms for delegation – and revise them, if 
necessary; it should also provide for tools and procedures for supervising the exercise 
of the delegated powers; 
- to ensure that the senior management defines the internal control structure, 
consistently with the selected type of risk propensity; that the control functions enjoy 
an appropriate degree of autonomy within the organization; that adequate resources 
are provided for them to operate properly; 
- to ensure that the information system provided for is correct, complete and acts 
timeously; 
- to ensure that the functionality, efficiency and effectiveness of the internal control 
system, vis-à-vis the corporate objectives and the evolution of the environmental and 
operating environment, are periodically overhauled and that the results of this process 
are reported to the board itself; in the case any shortcomings or anomalies are found, it 
must promptly adopt the most appropriate corrective measures. 
 
Due to the greater complexity of the activities to be carried out, compared to other types of 
business, financial intermediaries are characterised primarily by the larger size of their boards 
and the presence of a larger number of independent directors. Besides, in the case of financial 
intermediaries, more executive and audit committees are appointed, compared to other types 
of companies. This appears to be due to a greater need of coordination and policy-making, 
with respect to the various (external and internal) control activities prescribed by the 
applicable regulations (Carretta et al., 2006). 
In order to ensure the effective operation of the audit system, in fact, certain aspects of the 
process are very important, such as the holding of regular meetings between the board and the 
senior management, to examine and discuss the effectiveness of the internal audit system, the 
timely examination of the results of the audit assessments made by the management and by 
the internal and external auditors, or the implementation, on a regular basis, of measures 
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aimed at ensuring that the management appropriately follows up on any recommendations or 
reservations made by the auditors and the supervisory authorities, with respect to any 
weaknesses found in the audit system (Schwizer, 2005).  
In other words, the boards of financial intermediaries are required to take on a primary role – 
more so than other types of companies – with respect to supervising the achievement of the 
corporate objectives and the behaviour of the management, thus acting as a sort of guarantee 
for all the stakeholders. This role, however, does not consist solely in ensuring the due 
performance of the audit operations, but also translates into a proactive participation, by 
deploying its skills in the decision-making process and, as a result, in the achievement of the 
main objectives. This proactive contribution may take place, for example, by providing 
advice, encouragement, ideas and information to the management, aimed at attaining 
increasingly higher levels of stakeholder satisfaction. This requires more numerous meetings 
and better coordination of the activities of the directors and top managers. There are 
noticeable differences, in fact, with regard to both the number and average duration of 
meetings, between financial intermediaries and other types of companies (Carretta et al., 
2006). 
Moreover, with regard to corporate governance, the conscious assumption of responsibility by 
the board inevitably requires a development of the skills of the individual directors. A further 
ambit of differentiation, in fact, concerns the encouragement of proactive and contributory 
behaviours, which are key requisites for the boards of financial intermediaries, to ensure the 
effective performance of their role (Carretta, Schwizer, 2000). 
In greater detail, the board effectively contributes to performance if it can provide useful 
information or data for the formulation of the corporate strategies, or external contacts and 
opportunities to improve the firm’s market position. 
The multiple expertise, provenance and skills of the individual members of the board may 
help the management to broaden its points of view, in respect of the market opportunities, 
providing a wealth of ideas and critical opinions capable of improving the decision-making 
process and, as a result, overall performance (Andrews, 1983; Huse, Rindova, 2001).  
With regard to the relations that the boards of financial intermediaries must establish with the 
management, the Basel Committee’s guidelines on corporate governance (2005) summarize 
the directors’ role as follows: 
- to understand and become aware of one’s role, vis-à-vis the bank and its shareholders; 
- to take on the role of “check and balance” vis-à-vis the management; 
- to feel authorized to ask the management for information and to receive adequate 
explanations; 
- to introduce “best practices” from outside the BoD; 
- to provide unpartial opinion; 
- to prevent any conflicts of interest; 
- to regularly and adequately communicate with the management and audit bodies; 
- to abstain from any decisions, with respect to which one cannot guarantee the 
necessary objectivity; 
- not to participate in the day-to-day running of the bank; 
- to make an effort to ensure the efficiency of the decision-making process at board 
meetings. 
 
A further ambit of differentiation concerns the expectations expressed by stakeholders. In the 
financial sector, in fact, it often occurs that shareholders carrying out other functions may 
acquire stakes in the specialized financial intermediaries, or the banks themselves.  
This determines a characteristic problem of governance, consisting in the fact that a 
shareholder may have very different roles, such as to configure, in principle at least, figures of 
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stakeholders with multiple interests, who are not always immediately compatible (the so-
called ‘multiple-role shareholders’). 
Several studies (Carretta, 1998; Schwizer, 1998) have attempted to assess the impact of such 
peculiar corporate structures on the overall efficiency of the firm’s decisions, also taking 
account of any asymmetries in the weight of the shareholders in the different roles. 
The appreciation of the degree of balance and symmetry of the various roles played by each 
shareholder, in fact, may highlight any conflicts between these roles and, consequently, reveal 
the need of achieving an overall “harmony” in satisfying the various interests. Shareholder 
“satisfaction”, in fact, may depend on a number of factors, related to the complexity of the 
roles and interests, which must be assessed jointly. 
Therefore, it is expedient to know the effects of any potential conflicts of interest, with 
respect to the objectives of the different types of shareholders, based on the different weight 
of the relations established with the intermediary and of the interest in the institutional model 
resulting from the (distribution, production, etc.) alliance, by means of suitable performance 
indicators.  
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5. A model for evaluating a board’s effectiveness 
 
In this chapter we will propose a model for diagnosing the adequacy of a board and assessing 
its performance, as well as that of the individual directors, especially in the financial 
intermediary sector
12
.  
The model takes account of the previously outlined effectiveness parameters and makes it 
possible to express a judgement on the structural and organizational characteristics of the 
board and the contribution by the individual directors. The measurement of these elements is 
a prerequisite for understanding the role played by the board of financial intermediaries, for 
the purpose of creating value. 
We have followed a quantitative approach based on the observation of the characteristics of 
boards as a whole and of the individual directors. 
Each characteristic investigated here is represented in the model through a system of 
measurements and indicators, in order to identify the distinctive traits for producing a brief 
and reproducible evaluation.  
 
In particular, it can be assumed that the performance of the board may be assessed in the light 
of the following elements: i) the institutional characteristics of the BoD; ii) the organizational 
characteristics of the BoD; and iii) the directors’ skills and professional expertise. 
 
The logical structure of the model is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – Procedure for calculating the performance of a BoD 
 
BOARD EVALUATION  
= 
ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
+ 
ASSESSMENT OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
+ 
ASSESSMENT OF THE DIRECTORS’ PROFESSIONAL SKILLS 
 
 
The model provides for a system of grades, based on which the board can be classified 
according to various categories of effectiveness.  
 
 
5.1 Assessing the institutional and organizational characteristics 
The assessment of the institutional and organizational characteristics employs a series of 
indicators, which various studies have found to be positively linked to board performance. 
To measure them it is necessary to grade each of the items given in the following checklist 
(Table 1).  
In particular, the answers are arranged according to a scale based on the observation of the 
sectoral benchmarks, calibrated according to each single case. 
 
                                                 
12
 Partial versions of this model have already been adopted by the authors to specific cases in the financial sector. 
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Table 1 – Checklist for surveying the institutional and organizational characteristics 
CHARACTERISTICS YES         NO 
Institutional  
 
Is the size of the board adequate vis-à-vis the activities to be carried out? 
 
 
Are the roles of chairman of the board and chief executive separate? 
  
 
Is the degree of representativeness of the shareholders adequate? 
  
 
Is the number of independent directors higher than or equal to that of the executive directors?  
 
 
Do some directors also hold directorships in other companies? 
  
 
Are there any female directors? 
 
Organizational   
 
Have board committees been created? 
 
 
Are the tasks and powers apportioned and delegated (between the BoD, Executive Committee, 
senior management)?  
 
Are meetings held frequently (at least 7 times a year)? 
 
 
Are the board meetings attended by other stakeholders (managers, etc.)? 
 
 
Is there a policy for communicating price-sensitive information to the outside? 
 
 
Are remunerations commensurate to the commitment required from the directors’ (attendance 
time,  special tasks, required output and contribution)? 
 
 
5.2 Assessing the professional skills of the board 
Under the model provided for here, the professional skills of the board as a whole are a 
measure of the average skills of the individual directors (Figure 4). 
In particular, it is assumed that the professional skills of the board are the expression of the 
skills of the directors which, in turn, are the result of the experience and of the nature and type 
of training of the directors, in the timeframe taken into account, and of the contribution they 
provide. 
 
Figure 4 – Procedure for measuring the professional skills of the board 
 
PROFESSIONAL SKILLS OF THE BOARD (max 40 grades) 
= 
AVERAGE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DIRECTORS 
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In detail, the system for assessing the professional skills of the individual directors is based on 
three different methods of measurement, aimed at rating: 
- the degree of experience in the role; 
- the training qualifications; 
- the individual contribution provided.  
 
This system makes it possible to grade the professional skills of the individual directors, as 
follows (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 – Procedure for calculating the professional skills of the individual directors 
 
EXPERIENCE (Assignment of Handicap) 
+ 
TRAINING (max X grades) 
+ 
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION (max Y grades) 
 
 
 
The experience factor 
Experience is the product of the spatial and temporal extension of the role: spatial, because it 
increases if the director or auditor takes part in other activities outside the board, such as 
committees, ad hoc working groups or directorships in other companies; temporal because, as 
a rule, experience increases the more time a directors spends on a board. 
Experience is measured in the form of the reduction of an initial handicap (equal to a starting 
position of total inexperience in the role). 
The initial handicap (HCP), assigned to a director or auditor taking on the position for the first 
time, corresponds to a certain grade, which is gradually reduced, over the years, until it 
becomes zero. 
The following table gives the weight of the single activities carried out by the directors, vis-à-
vis the individual handicap (Table 2): 
 
Table 2 – Checklist for measuring the initial handicap (HCP) due to inexperience 
 
Activity 
 
Weight over HCP (in a year) 
 
number of years on a board as director or auditor (either consecutively 
or non-consecutively) 
⇒ 1 year 
 
number of board appointments, as director or auditor 
⇒ 1 board 
 
number of firm board meetings attended 
⇒ 1 meeting 
 
tasks assigned on the board (yet to be defined) 
⇒ d1) 
… 
 
number of committee/working group appointments 
⇒ 1 appointment 
 
membership of professional bodies (compatible with his/her position) 
⇒ 1 membership 
 
…  
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Training 
The training undergone during the period spent on a board, as a director or auditor, reflects 
the will to develop role-related skills and its effectiveness, in respect of both the individual 
and the firm. At this stage of the project account is taken only of the training undergone by 
the directors or auditors. The grades assigned for each attendance are based on the length of 
the meeting and the nature of the subjects addressed there. 
Giving grades to training may encourage the directors, who are required to commit 
themselves to constant updating and professional improvement, and even the companies, who 
may thus enhance the quality of their governance model by investing directly in the skills of 
their directors.  
 
Individual contribution 
Measuring the individual contribution of board members is fundamental, especially with a 
view to improving the efficiency and capacity of this body to fully perform its function of 
governing and supervising the management’s work. This importance, however, is offset by 
the considerable difficulties encountered in qualifying and defining objective measures. For 
final assessment purposes, the performance-linked proportion of the grades, even though 
potentially important will be taken into account only if positive, in order to reward any special 
contribution provided by the parties undergoing the assessment (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 – Evaluating individual contribution 
Contribution 8on-assessable Sufficient Good Excellent 
     
Reasons 
,o significant 
actions, for the 
purpose of assessing 
the performance of 
the board / firm; 
limited attendance of 
meetings; 
scarce activism 
,o significant 
actions, for the 
purpose of assessing 
the performance of 
the board / firm; 
good attendance of 
meetings; 
sufficient activism 
 
Various significant 
actions, for the 
purpose of assessing 
the performance of 
the board / firm; 
constant attendance 
of meetings; high 
activism 
Decisive actions, for 
the purpose of 
assessing the 
performance of the 
board / firm; high 
attendance of 
meetings; 
extraordinary 
activism 
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6. Conclusions 
 
An effective and efficient BoD is a keystone in the governance mechanisms of financial 
intermediaries. The responsibilities of this body are particularly complex and range from the 
determination of the strategic policy lines to supervising the work of the senior management. 
The starting point of the paper is the conviction that there is a positive relationship between 
the quality of BoD and the creation of value for the shareholders. Based on this consideration, 
this paper provides, first of all, a review of the most important available literature on relations 
between the board and performance. This is followed by an analysis of the principal aspects 
of evaluation of boards in the various models, a classification of the most commonly used 
tools and are presented the principal ambits of differentiation for the development of an ad-
hoc model of evaluation for the boards of financial intermediaries. 
Lastly, on a more strictly operational plane, the paper develops an evaluation model of the 
quality of BoD taking into account the important role of this body in financial intermediaries. 
The model focuses on the assessment of the institutional, organizational and individual 
characteristics of the BoDs of financial intermediaries, with a view to rating their overall 
quality. 
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